Ibn Taymiyyah رحمه الله on Invoking the Dead

Feb 14 / Sh. Joe Bradford

A Critical Analysis of Dr. Hatem Al-Haj’s Classification of Istighathah

In his article “Al-Istighātha (Seeking Relief) An Attempt at a Reasoned but Uncompromising Approach to a Divisive Question,” Dr. Hatem Al-Haj offers an interpretation of Ibn Taymiyyah’s position on invoking the dead that turns on a specific grammatical reading. After presenting his own view that such invocation “is either major shirk if the supplicant believes that the one called upon possesses any of the exclusive attributes of Lordship (rubūbiyyah) or Divinity (ulūhiyyah), or it is a means leading to shirk,”[1] Dr. Al-Haj claims to find this same taxonomy in Ibn Taymiyyah’s works.

I. Introduction

The interpretive core of Dr. Al-Haj’s argument appears in this passage:[2]


انظر إلى قوله “فإن هذا شرك أو ذريعة إلى الشرك” وإلى قوله “بخلاف من دعاه في مغيبه، فإن ذلك يفضي إلى الشرك به.” إن الذريعة إلى الشيء ليست الشيء نفسه وإن ما يفضي إلى الشيء ليس الشيء نفسه، وقد أكثر الإمام تقي الدين في كتبه من وصف الاستغاثة بأنها شرك أو ذريعة إلى الشرك. و”أو” تفيد هنا التقسيم لا محالة، لا التردد أو الإبهام، كما يقال “الكلمة اسم أو فعل أو حرف” ومعلوم أن الاسم غير الفعل والفعل غير الحرف، وكلها كلمة، فالاستغاثة الممنوعة قسمان شرك أو ذريعة إليه. ومناط التفريق لا بد أنه نية المستغيث ومعتقده.

Dr. Al-Haj’s English rendering states:

Looking at his words - “for this is shirk or a means leading to shirk” - and his statement - “unlike one who calls upon him in his absence, for that leads to shirk with him” - it becomes clear that a means to something is not the thing itself, and that what leads to something is not identical to that thing.

Imam Taqī al-Dīn frequently describes istighāthah in his works as “shirk or a means to shirk.” Here, the particle “or” (aw) necessarily indicates classification (taqsīm), not doubt or ambiguity - much like the statement, “A word is a noun or a verb or a particle,” where it is known that the noun is not the verb, the verb is not the particle, and yet all are “words.” Thus, the prohibited istighāthah falls into two categories: either shirk itself, or a means leading to it. The criterion for distinguishing between them must, inevitably, be the intention (niyyah) and belief (iʿtiqād) of the one seeking aid.

The argument proceeds from two premises treated as axiomatic:

1. “A means to something is not the thing itself” (الذريعة إلى الشيء ليست الشيء نفسه)
2. “What leads to something is not the thing itself” (ما يفضي إلى الشيء ليس الشيء نفسه)

From these premises, Dr. Al-Haj concludes that when Ibn Taymiyyah uses both “shirk” and “means to shirk” joined by the particle aw in reference to the same practice, the particle must be performing classificatory work (taqsīm). The two characterizations cannot both apply to the same instance, since means and ends are necessarily distinct. Therefore, aw must be sorting different instances of invoking the dead into separate categories based on some criterion external to the act itself.

He identifies this criterion as “the intention (niyyah) and belief (iʿtiqād) of the one seeking aid” (نية المستغيث ومعتقده). This reading produces a taxonomy in which identical external acts receive different theological classifications. Invoking the dead becomes shirk when the invoker attributes to the dead person qualities belonging only to God, but remains merely a prohibited means (dharīʿah) when the invoker maintains correct theological beliefs about the invoked person’s nature and capacities. The author frames this interpretation as textual recovery rather than innovation, presenting the pattern as evidence that the taqsīm reading represents Ibn Taymiyyah’s consistent method across his corpus.[3]

II. The Stakes of This Reading

If Dr. Al-Haj’s reading holds, identical external acts of invoking the dead receive different theological classifications based on the invoker’s internal beliefs. A person at a tomb requesting aid from its occupant performs an act that constitutes major shirk only if accompanied by beliefs attributing divine capacities to the deceased, but remains merely a prohibited means (dharīʿah) if the person maintains correct theological beliefs about the deceased’s metaphysical limits. The author’s classification thus hinges on theological sophistication rather than on the act itself.


The “recovery” of Ibn Taymiyyah’s actual position lies in the claim that “Imam Taqī al-Dīn frequently describes istighāthah in his works as ‘shirk or a means to shirk’” and that this pattern requires the taqsīm reading.[4] If this holds, then widespread contemporary citations of Ibn Taymiyyah have misconstrued his fundamental taxonomy. Dr. Al-Haj writes not as a historian but as someone offering guidance on a “divisive question” in contemporary Muslim communities.[5] This admission on his part is key, as his interpretation serves to support his own position that istighāthah “is either major shirk if the supplicant believes that the one called upon possesses any of the exclusive attributes of Lordship or Divinity, or it is a means leading to shirk.”[6] Therefore, this historical question about Ibn Taymiyyah’s position serves the author’s present theological purposes. The openness and transparency are laudable, and the argument put forth by Dr. al-Haj deserves an inductive, historical analysis to determine whether this reading is correct.

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